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Abstract
We present in this article a precise security model for data conﬁdentiality in the framework of ASP (Asyn-
chronous Sequential Processes). ASP is based on active objects, asynchronous communications, and data-
ﬂow synchronizations. We extend it with security levels attached to activities (active objects) and trans-
mitted data.
We design a security model that guarantees data conﬁdentiality within an application; this security model
takes advantages of both mandatory and discretionary access models. We extend the semantics of ASP
with predicate conditions that provide a formal security framework, dynamically checking for unauthorized
information ﬂows. As a ﬁnal result, all authorized communication paths are secure: no disclosure of
information can happen. This theoretically-founded contribution may have a strong impact on distributed
object-based applications, that are more and more present and conﬁdentiality-demanding on the Internet,
it also arises a new issue in data conﬁdentiality: authorization of secured information ﬂow transiting (by
the mean of futures) through an unsecured component.
Keywords: Access control, distribution, objects, futures.
1 Introduction
The main contribution of this work is to provide data conﬁdentiality and secure infor-
mation ﬂows for asynchronous distributed object-based applications. The proposed
security model heavily relies on security policy rules with mandatory enforcements
for the control of information ﬂow. While information ﬂows are generally veriﬁed
statically [20,3,15,14,25,22,16,10], our attention is focused on dynamic veriﬁcations.
To achieve it, our model has an information control policy that includes discretionary
rules, and because these rules are by nature dynamically enforceable, we can take
advantage of the dynamic checks to carry out at the same time all mandatory checks.
1 University of Westminster - Harrow School of Computer Science - Harrow, HA1 3TP (UK)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 180 (2007) 17–34
1571-0661  © 2007 Elsevier B.V.     
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.045
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
As another advantage of this approach, dynamic checks do not require to modify
compilers, do not alter the programming languages, do not require modiﬁcations to
existing source codes, and provide ﬂexibility at run-time. Thus, dynamic checks ﬁt
well in a middleware layer which, in a non-intrusive manner, provides and ensures
security services to upper-level applications.
Our underlying programming model [8] is based on active objects, asynchronous
communications, and data-ﬂow synchronizations. On the security side, security
levels are used to independently tag the entities involved in the communication
events: active objects and transmitted data. These “independent” tagging is however
subject to discretionary rules. The combination of mandatory and discretionary
rules allows to relax the strict controls imposed by the mandatory rules.
Overview
As activities do not share memory, our security mechanism associates a security level
to each activity (an activity is a set of objects manipulated by a single thread). Ad-
ditionally, a level can be associated to data transmitted between activities (request
parameters and created activities). Our mechanism is based on the strict notions
of “no write-down” and “no read-up” taken from the model of Bell-LaPadula [4],
but discretionary rules allow to associate speciﬁc level to communicated data; thus
avoiding restrictiveness of the above notions. Dynamic checks are performed at ac-
tivity creation, request and reply communications. The advantages of this approach
are twofold:
a sound foundation. This security model is founded on a strong theoretical back-
ground, the ASP calculus [7,6], related to well-known formalisms [14,13,10,9]. We
extend the formal semantics of ASP with predicate conditions. This provides a
formal basis to our model, and makes it possible to dynamically check for unau-
thorized accesses. Finally, in order to prove the correctness of our security model,
an intuitive secure information ﬂow property is deﬁned and proved to be ensured
by the application of access control model.
scalability and ﬂexibility. We also target practical use of this model, with an
implementation into middlewares, e.g. ProActive [21]. The granularity of our
security model is deﬁned in order to make it both eﬃcient (because there is no
security check inside an activity) and ﬁnely tunable: levels can be deﬁned on
activities but a speciﬁc level can be given to communicated data.
The impact of this work lies on the recent changes of paradigms in the area of
distributed computing. The service oriented nature of ASP makes communications
asymmetric (request and replies) and asynchronous. This security framework is, to
our knowledge, the ﬁrst to be adapted to the speciﬁcities of these communications.
One of the main novel issues revealed by this work is the case of the ﬁrst class futures
(futures are promises of reply), and the fact that some secured information ﬂows,
impossible in other security frameworks, can be envisioned for secured asynchronous
services.
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Section 2 recalls our base model for objects and communications. Section 3.1
presents an access control model that can has been implemented for ASP. Section
3.2 deﬁnes and veriﬁes an intuitive secure information ﬂow property: an informa-
tion ﬂow is secure if all activity creations, requests and replies transmissions are
secure. Section 3.3 analyzes the speciﬁcity of our security model for service-oriented
computing. Next, relation to existing work is discussed in section 4. An appendix
gives an example showing the kind of security policy we are able to ensure, and the
speciﬁcity of our model.
2 A Model for Objects and Communications
distributed over (single threaded) activities, without shared memory. Activities
communicate by asynchronous method calls, and reply by means of futures, thus
leading to a data-ﬂow synchronization. Futures allow latency hiding without loosing,
neither ease of programming nor eﬃciency. This paper will soundly formalize the
security of information ﬂow for this recent programming methodology: asynchronous
service-oriented programming.
2.1 Distributed Object Model
The ASP calculus is an extension of the impς-calculus [1] where asynchronous com-
municating processes prevail. These processes, or activities, are running in parallel,
but with their internal operations executed sequentially. What makes it outstanding
are the concepts of active objects, wait-by-necessity, and futures. An active object is
a “classical” object which is to be run remotely, in an activity, with its own sequential
thread of execution. Table 1 presents the syntax of the ASP language. The classical
sequential reduction rules for the semantics description can be found in [7].
a, b ∈ L’ ::= x variable,
| [li = bi;mj = ς(xj , yj)aj ]
i∈1..n
j∈1..m object,
| a.li ﬁeld access,
| a.li := b ﬁeld update,
| a.mj(b) method call,
| clone(a) superﬁcial copy,
| Active(a,mj) object activation,
| Serve(m1, ..,mn)
n>0 service primitive,
| ι location (not in source).
| a ⇑ f, b a with continuation b
Table 1
The ASP calculus syntax
It is important to note that an activity is composed of only one active object,
many passive (i.e., classical) objects and also many references to other active objects.
As an example, Figure 1 shows activities α and β, where activity α has (among
other entities) its own active object, two passive objects and a reference to activity
β. Additionally, there is no shared memory: passive objects can only be referenced
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by objects belonging to the same activity, but any object can reference an active
one.
One of the main contribution of ASP is the formalization of futures and request-
reply patterns of communication. Futures are generalized references representing
promises of reply that can be manipulated as a classical object (i.e. copied and
transmitted inside and between activities) while their real value is not needed. An
operation that needs the value of the object (e.g. a ﬁeld access) is blocked until the
necessary reply occurs. This automatic and transparent synchronization mechanism
is called wait-by-necessity.
Fig. 1. Example of a parallel conﬁguration
Recalling the ASP syntax and semantics, a parallel conﬁguration is a set of
activities (α, β, γ ∈ Act) of the form: P, Q ::= α[a;σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ β[· · · ] ‖ · · ·
where a is the current term to be reduced; σ is the store containing all objects
belonging to activity α; ι is the active object location; F is the list associating each
result of a served request to its futures; R is the list of pending requests; and f is the
future of the current term. Additional semantic notations are: locations ι and future
identiﬁers fi are local to an activity; a future f
α→β
i is deﬁned by an identiﬁer fi, a
source activity α and a destination activity β according to the request; a reference
to the active object of activity α is denoted by AO(α); and a reference to a future
is denoted by fut(fα→βi ).
Informally, ASP semantics consists in partitioning objects into distinct activities
manipulated by a single thread (no memory is shared). Those activities communicate
by asynchronous request-response mechanism: When an object perform a method
call an an active object (i.e., remote object), a request is enqueued on the callee side
I. Attali et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 180 (2007) 17–3420
and the caller receives a future (an empty object that will be ﬁlled with the result
of the request).
(a, σ) →S (a
′, σ′) →S does not clone a future
α[a; σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P −→ α[a′; σ′; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P
(local)
γ fresh activity ι′ ∈ dom(σ)
σ′ = {ι′ → AO(γ)} :: σ σγ = copy(ι′′, σ)
α[R[Active(ι′′, mj)]; σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P −→
α[R[ι′];σ′; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ γ[ι′′.mj(); σγ ; ι
′′; ∅; ∅; ∅] ‖ P
(newact)
σα(ι) = AO(β) ι′′ ∈ dom(σβ ) f
α→β
i new future
ιf ∈ dom(σα) σ
′
β = Copy&Merge(σα, ι
′ ; σβ , ι
′′)
σ′α = {ιf → fut(f
α→β
i )} :: σα
α[R[ι.mj(ι′)];σα; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ ;σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
α[R[ιf ];σ
′
α; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ ;σ
′
β ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ :: [mj ; ι
′′; fα→βi ]; fβ ] ‖ P
(request)
R = R′ :: [mj ; ιr ; f ′] :: R′′ mj ∈ M ∀m ∈ M, m /∈ R′
α[R[Serve(M)];σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P −→
α[ι.mj(ιr) ⇑ f,R[[]];σ; ι;F ;R
′ :: R′′; f ′] ‖ P
(serve)
ι′ ∈ dom(σ) F ′ = F :: {f → ι′}
σ′ = Copy&Merge(σ, ι ; σ, ι′)
α[ι ⇑ f ′, a; σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P −→ α[a;σ′; ι;F ′;R; f ′] ‖ P
(endservice)
σα(ι) = fut(f
γ→β
i ) Fβ(f
γ→β
i ) = ιf
σ′α = Copy&Merge(σβ , ιf ; σα, ι)
α[aα;σα; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ ; σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
α[aα; σ′α; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ ;σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P
(reply)
Table 2
Parallel reduction
2.2 Communication Model
The ASP communication model is based on the parallel reduction rules shown in
Table 2. These rules are based on a copy(ι, σ) operator which performs a deep copy
of the store σ starting at location ι and Copy&Merge(σβ, ι
′ ; σα, ι) which appends, at
the location ι of the store σα, a deep copy of the store σβ starting at location ι
′.
From these reduction rules, only the communication rules (newact, request
and reply) are involved in the security framework. The newact reduction rule
creates a new activity γ containing the deep copy of an object. A generalized
reference to this activity AO(γ) is stored in the source activity α. In the request
reduction rule, activity α sends a new request to activity β. The new request
[mj ; ι
′′; fα→βi ] is made up of the target method mj, the location ι
′′ of the argument
passed in the request message, and the future identiﬁer fα→βi which will be related
to the response resulting from the request. Note that in location ι′′ there is a deep
copy of the argument passed to the target method. The reply reduction rule, takes
a reference to a future and updates it with its value. The reference to the future must
exist in one activity α and the corresponding value must have been calculated in
another activity β. Note that a future fγ→βi can be updated in an activity diﬀerent
from the origin of the request (γ = α).
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3 The Security Model
In this section, we deﬁne a security model that guarantees the classic property of
data conﬁdentiality for multi-level security systems: a speciﬁc user with the appro-
priate clearance will be given access only to the information that he/she is allowed
to handle. This notion of data conﬁdentiality must not be confused with the con-
ﬁdentiality provided by encryption mechanisms (i.e. information obscuring). The
security terminology uses the subjects-objects relationship [24], and because the
word “object” can be confusing here, we refer to this relationship as “subject-target”.
We ﬁrst recall usual notions of access control models and deﬁne our model in
terms of entities and secured communications; which means that we formally ex-
tend ASP into Secure ASP. Then, we present our notion of secure information ﬂow
between activities with an important property for data conﬁdentiality. We ﬁnally
point out a fundamental aspect of the expressiveness of our model for service-oriented
computing.
3.1 Access Control Model
Access control models are generally classiﬁed into mandatory (MAC) or discretionary
(DAC) models. The MAC model can be best described through the Multi-Level
Security (MLS) model which is based on a lattice of security levels assigned to sub-
jects and targets. Once levels are assigned, neither “normal users” nor processes can
change them; making the system more secure against unauthorized access to the
information. The MLS model is suited to address the conﬁdentiality issue in infor-
mation ﬂows, but its inconvenience is that in certain cases it is less than adequate
for practical systems. DAC models are based on an access control matrix relating
rights on subjects over targets, where the rights may be assigned at the “discretion”
of the “normal users” or their processes; this simple form of operation makes it more
ﬂexible compared to MLS.
The solution we propose is based on the concepts of MLS, with analogous notions
of “no write-down” and “no read-up” taken from the model of Bell-LaPadula [4], but
it is generalized here by introducing exceptions according to discretionary rules.
We begin by describing all entities involved in our security framework:
• S is the set of activities acting as subjects and/or targets: α, β, γ, ... ∈ S;
• D is the set of objects sent in the arguments of REQUESTS; a REQUEST is now
written as Rqα→β(d) where d = σα(ι
′) ∈ D,
• R is the set of objects associated to futures, and returned in REPLIES; a REPLY
is now written as Rpβ→α(r) where r = σβ(ιf ) ∈ R.
Let A be the set of actions involved in the security mechanisms, i.e., REQUEST,
REPLY and NEWACT. The following notations are added to ASP:
• Security levels λ are taken from a ﬁnite set L, partially ordered by the relation
≤, ∀i ∈ S ∪ D ∪R, λi ∈ L,
• T ⊆ S × S ×A represents the authorized actions (source, destination, action),
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• the matrix M : S × S→P(A) gives explicit (discretionary) rights to assign a
level to a given data for a given action. For each subject-target pair, the matrix
contains a set of authorized actions involving the assignation of a security level.
P(A) classically denotes the set of sets of actions. The classic subject-target-
action matrix is extended to include (allowed) security levels. This matrix can be
implemented with a security policy ﬁle (e.g. XACML policy ﬁles [11]).
This results in the following characterization of actions:
• Nw(γ, λγ) is a modiﬁed activity creation rule (NEWACT) in order to assign a
security level λγ to a created activity γ,
• Rqα→β(d, λin) is a modiﬁed REQUEST transmission rule tagging the transmitted
data with a security level (the programmer gives a security level to data d),
• Rpβ→α(r) is a REPLY transmission rule unchanged from original ASP.
To summarize, a ∈ A if and only if a = Rqα→β(d, λin) ∨ a = Rpβ→α(r) ∨ a =
Nw(γ, λγ). Moreover, to be precise, M only has values in REQUEST or NEWACT.
That is to say, it is not possible in our model to give to replies a discretionary right.
The security levels of subjects, targets, data and responses reﬂect the form of
communications handled by activities. Figure 2 shows this form of communications.
All activities are tagged with a security level and all objects and their methods
therein contained will automatically inherit that level (a and b are objects, ms is
the calling method of the source activity, and mt is the target method). Every data
d used in a request transfer is also marked with a security level but this level is
independent from that of the source activity.
mt λindx=b. ( )
λind
processingdata
r λt
λαa
msλα
βλb
mt
βλ
λαα βλβ
(task)
targetsubject
Fig. 2. Communication between security-marked activities.
It is the programmer responsibility to assign the security level to data d. Conse-
quently, the level of the transmitted data will be added to the syntax of the method
call (see Table 3). Even if it is not detailed in the following, a default behavior
should consist in assigning the level of the sender activity to data d sent as request
parameter. In turn, every value r returned in a reply transfer will automatically be
tagged with the security level of the target method (level inherited from the activ-
ity). This form of tagging allows output data to be independent of input data in
the processing method, in other words, the security level for the output data does
not depend on the level of the input data but on the processing of the data itself.
The conditions for secure communications in ASP are then derived and formal-
ized according to our policy for communications:
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Deﬁnition 1 (Secure activity creation)
∀α, γ ∈ S, (α, γ,Nw(γ, λγ )) ∈ T ⇐⇒ (λα ≤ λγ) ∨Nw(γ, λγ) ∈M(α, γ)
An activity creation Nw(γ, λγ) is authorized if the activity is created with a level
greater or equal to the one of the source activity. Else, if α wants to downgrade
the data (i.e., the objects) used to create this new activity then there must be an
explicit right allowing such an operation.
Deﬁnition 2 (Secure request transmission)
∀α, β ∈ S, (α, β,Rqα→β(d, λin)) ∈ T ⇔ (λin ≤ λβ) ∧0
@
((λα > λin) ∧ Rqα→β(d, λin) ∈M(α, β))
∨ (λα ≤ λin)
∨ ∃γ, δ, fi, d = fut(f
γ→δ
i )
1
A
The request transmission Rqα→β(d, λin) is authorized if the security level λin of the
transmitted data d, is smaller or equal to the security level λβ of the target activity
β; or, when source activity α with level λα tries to assign a level λin to data d
(i.e. a data downgrading), there is an explicit right (discretionary rule M(α, β))
that grants it. The philosophy behind a secure request transmission is to “release”
information only to a target which holds the appropriate clearance.
We also have a safe request transmission if the security level of data λin is greater
or equal than that of the source λα. In that case, we have λα ≤ λin ≤ λβ, showing
that activity α safely releases data d because d has a greater security level, and at
the same time, activity β receives a lower level data.
Moreover, a safe request transmission is also achieved when handling future
references fut(fγ→δi ) as data. Future references can be freely transmitted between
activities because they do not hold any valuable information. We recall that values
associated to futures hold information but future references only hold addresses or
directions pointing to futures. In this sense, if a future reference is known, it does
not mean we can directly get the future value, because anyway, the future value
transmission will be performed by, and submitted to the security rules of, a secure
reply transmission.
Deﬁnition 3 (Secure reply transmission)
∀α, β ∈ S : (α, β,Rpβ→α(r)) ∈ T ⇐⇒ (λβ ≤ λα) ∨ (∃γ, δ, fi, r = fut(f
γ→δ
i ))
The secure reply transmission REPLY Rpβ→α(r) is authorized if the security level
λβ of target β is smaller or equal to the security level λα of subject α, or if the
transmitted result r only consists of a reference to a future fγ→δi .
Table 3 shows the diﬀerences between the secure ASP calculus and the original
one (Table 1): security information is added to the activation and method call terms.
After attaching a security level to each activity, parallel conﬁgurations are now
of the following form: P,Q ::= αλα [a;σ; ι;F ;R; f ]‖βλβ [· · · ]‖ · · ·
Finally, Table 4 presents the semantics of the secure parallel ASP calculus. These
semantics rules ensure secure information ﬂow. They use the security information
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a, b ∈ L′ ::= a.mj(b
λin) method call,
| Activeλa(a,mj) object activation,
| . . .
Table 3
Secure ASP calculus: modiﬁed primitives
γ fresh activity ι′ ∈ dom(σ) σ′ = {ι′ → AO(γ)} :: σ
σγ = copy(ι′′, σ) (α, γ,Nw(γ, λγ)) ∈ T
αλ[R[Activeλa(ι′′,mj)];σ; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ P −→
αλ[R[ι′];σ′; ι;F ;R; f ] ‖ γλa [ι′′.mj(); σγ ; ι′′; ∅; ∅; ∅] ‖ P
(Secnewact)
σα(ι) = AO(β) ι′′ ∈ dom(σβ ) f
α→β
i new future
ιf ∈ dom(σα) σ
′
β = Copy&Merge(σα, ι
′ ; σβ , ι
′′)
σ′α = {ιf → fut(f
α→β
i )} :: σα (α, β,Rqα→β(σα(ι
′), λin)) ∈ T
αλα [R[ι.mj(ι
′λin )];σα; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ ;σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
αλα [R[ιf ];σ
′
α; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ ;σ
′
β ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ :: [mj ; ι
′′; fα→βi ]; fβ ] ‖ P!
(Secrequest)
σα(ι) = fut(f
γ→β
i ) Fβ(f
γ→β
i ) = ιf
σ′α = Copy&Merge(σβ , ιf ; σα, ι) (β, α, Rpβ→α(σβ (ιf ))) ∈ T
αλα [aα; σα; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ ;σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
αλα [aα;σ′α; ια;Fα;Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ ; σβ ; ιβ ;Fβ ;Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P
(Secreply)
Table 4
Secure parallel reduction rules
attached to the activation and method call terms (λa and λin in the Nw(γ, λa) and
Rqα→β(d, λin) rules) to verify the secure transmission and activity creation deﬁned
before (Deﬁnitions 1, 2 and 3). When a communication is not authorized, from the
formal point of view, it is simply blocked. In practice a dedicated exception should
be raised and appropriately handled.
3.2 Secure Information Flow in the Object Model
We formally deﬁne the notion of information ﬂow between activities. The considered
entities are activities together with their passive objects, and not passive objects on
their own. Because activities can be distributed, Non-Interference related notions
[12] can not be directly applied to our model.
Next, system-wide information ﬂows are described by a path. The path is the
route along which the information travels, it is constructed by a chain of communi-
cating activities where a subject activity is the starting-point and a target activity is
the end-point of the path. Each information transmission observed on each activity
will serve for the construction of a path. This path will be called ﬂow-path.
Flow-paths fp are lists of activities (fp := α.β. · · · ). They consist of the ordered
list of transiting activities for a given information ﬂow. For example ϕγ.δ(α, β) means
that some information has been transmitted from activity α to activity β through
activities γ and δ. Concatenation of ﬂow-paths fp and fp′ is denoted by fp.fp′.
By application of the security mechanisms to the non-secure information ﬂow and
ﬂow-paths, a ﬁrst property results: previous deﬁnition of information ﬂow for an
activity becomes secure if all activity creations, requests and replies transmissions
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are secure.
Deﬁnition 4 (Secure information ﬂow) An elementary ﬂow of information is
either based on the sending of a request, or on the sending of a reply, or on the
creation of an activity. A ﬂow of information is sequentially composed of several
elementary ﬂows. The ﬂow-path of any ﬂow of information is the concatenation of
intermediate activities, it allows us to retrieve the original elementary ﬂows. Secure
information ﬂow is built by concatenation of elementary secure information ﬂows
which are secured communications: secure request, reply, or newact. Formally:
(α, β,Rqα→β(σ(ι
′), λin)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(α, β)
(β, α,Rpβ→α(σα(ιf ))) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(β, α)
(α, γ,Nw(γ, λγ )) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(α, γ)
Secϕfp1(α, γ) Secϕfp2(γ, β)
Secϕfp1.γ.fp2(α, β)
The following property states that a ﬂow of information is secured if and only if
it follows a secure path.
Property (Secure path for information ﬂow) A ﬂow of information is secured
if and only if it is composed of elementary secure information ﬂows.
Secϕγ1···γn(α, β) ⇐⇒ Secϕ∅(α, γ1) ∧ Secϕ∅(γ1, γ2) ∧ · · · ∧ Secϕ∅(γn, β)
The proof of this property is straightforward; it is obtained by induction on the
length of the information ﬂow path and by a case analysis on the rules of Deﬁnition 4.
This property does not take advantage of the MAC aspect of our model. Indeed,
the same property could have been obtained with a purely DAC approach. This
property rather shows that our speciﬁc and somehow less restrictive deﬁnition of
information ﬂow does not compromise secured information ﬂow. A secured infor-
mation ﬂow property using the MAC aspect of our security policy is beyond the
scope of this study. More generally, the study of the relation between mandatory
and discretionary rules is closely related to the work of Bertino et al. [5].
Compared with other solutions, our secure information ﬂow is the simple compo-
sition of a complex elementary ﬂow. This results from the adaptation of the security
formalism to a speciﬁc service-oriented framework. Complexity of the elementary
ﬂow comes from the asymmetric and asynchronous nature of ASP communications.
Once such basic secure communications are ensured, the security of information
ﬂows is veriﬁed in a simple and intuitive manner. The soundness of secure infor-
mation ﬂow is thus ensured by a precise deﬁnition of information in the previous
section and the fact that secure communications deﬁned in Section 3.1 ensure that
every information ﬂow must verify the security policy.
Also note that the way our discretionary rights matrix is built allows to envision
a precise tuning concerning the (dynamic) entities involved and the levels that can
be assigned to data when downgrading them.
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3.3 Speciﬁcity of Service-Oriented Computing
Preceding sections showed how classical MAC and DAC security principles can be
adapted to ASP and extended, ﬁnally ensuring both ﬂexibility and scalability.
Future references are ﬁrst class objects and can be passed between activities
(feature known as automatic continuations), thus they have an important conse-
quence concerning the secured ﬂows of information. Indeed, without automatic
continuations, a ﬂow of replies would directly follow the opposite path that a ﬂow of
requests. In other words, in a classical mandatory ruled system, a request-reply pat-
tern of communications can only occur between entities that have the same security
level.
A ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to authorize discretionary exceptions to these
rules concerning level of data transmitted by requests. This allows some request-
reply pattern to occur when the request sends non conﬁdential data.
Req γ Active Object
f’2
Active ObjectReqδ
f2
Active Object
β
f1
AO(  )δ
γ
δ
AO(  )γ
Fig. 3. A classical example: delegation
The possibility to transmit future references leads to a model well adapted spe-
ciﬁc to service-oriented computing. Let us focus on the conﬁguration of Figure 3.
This conﬁguration can be obtained by a classical scenario: β makes a request to γ
(future f2); but β is only an intermediate and delegates to δ the responsibility to
calculate the ﬁnal result (future f ′2). Let us suppose that λδ ≤ λβ < λγ , that is
to say the intermediate activity γ has a (too) high security level (this may be the
reason why the request has been delegated).
If one did not have automatic continuation, γ could not return the value of future
f2 because it is a future reference to f
′
2. Anyway, δ can reply to γ (because λδ < λγ)
but γ cannot forward this result value to β because λβ < λγ . Indeed, the derivation
transmitting the result from δ to β cannot be derived by the preceding rules (not
authorized means reduction rule cannot be applied):
λδ < λγ
(δ, γ, Rpδ→γ(result)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(δ, γ)
not authorized
(γ, β,Rpγ→β(r
′)) /∈ T
Secϕ∅(γ, β)
Secϕγ(δ, β)
One could expect a better behavior because the direct reply from δ to β should
be authorized according to the security model: δ cannot reply only because there is
an intermediate activity γ. Indeed if the request had not transited by γ the reply
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would be authorized. This is why the secured communication rules state that,futures
can be freely transmitted (remember a future does not hold valuable information);
consequently γ can reply to β if the response is restricted to a future reference.
Afterward, δ can reply directly to β because λδ ≤ λβ , and β obtains the real value
associated to f2.
r = f ′γ→δ
2
(γ, β,Rpγ→β(r)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(γ, β)
λδ ≤ λβ
(δ, β, Rpδ→β(r)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(δ, β)
This example justiﬁes the possibility to freely transmit future references and
demonstrates a communication pattern that would not be possible without the ex-
pressiveness of futures and the speciﬁc secured rules that exist in our mechanism.
Whereas, in ASP, the order in which future update occur has no consequence on the
execution of a program, this example shows that in Secure ASP it is important to
adopt a convenient future update strategy.
4 Related Work
Henessy and Riely present an extension of π-calculus [18,19], a calculus aimed at
distributed systems, extended through the use of (security) types [14]. We do not
employ explicit channels to communicate but the read and write actions are analo-
gous to receiving or sending requests and replies (a read when the request or reply
is received, and a write when the request or reply is sent). Additionally, their pro-
cesses may be analogous to our activities, but in general the security policies are not
compatible nor they can be encoded in our model even with analogous notions.
Bertino et al. [5] treat exception-based information ﬂow controls in object-
oriented systems. They extend close work from Jajodia, Kogan, Sandhu [17] and
Samarati et al. [23] to include operations (exceptions) normally not allowed by the
strict security policy. They use an ACL (discretionary control) to operate on write
and create actions, and with the permissive exceptions, they relax the strict policy
imposed on those same actions. The use of exceptions to alter the strict appli-
cations mandatory rules of [5] is similar to the use of discretionary conditions in
our framework. Both mechanisms allow one to bypass the rigorous application of
strict/mandatory access controls.
Attali, Caromel and Contes present high-level rules which deﬁne a security policy
for GRID applications built upon ProActive [2]. It is based on a discretionary
approach where entities follow a hierarchical structure and relies on a Public Key
Infrastructure. By comparison, our work focuses only on the communication actions,
studies conﬁdentiality in information ﬂows speciﬁc to service-oriented applications,
and uses both discretionary and mandatory approaches.
On the practical (implementation) side, Java-like languages that include infor-
mation ﬂow controls (as in [3,20]) could be complemented with our model. They
control information ﬂows inside a program, so they could be enhanced to control
all communication interactions with other local and non-local programs, in either
distributed or cooperative systems.
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Comparing to previous work, Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 put together a combination of
independent mandatory and discretionary controls, but the discretionary condition
is evaluated only when the transmission involves a data downgrading case. This does
not represent a standard way of policy enforcement because we also have the ability
to verify the security level of a new activity (i.e. a whole entity which encapsulates
data), and of a single transmitted data (i.e. data sent in requests). Moreover,
deﬁnition 4 is implicitly based on the Bell-LaPadula model, where security at run-
time takes into account a state machine with an initial secure state, and whose
transitions from state to state are secure if the access rules are not violated.
5 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We have presented a precise security model for the secure information ﬂow in ASP.
The solution is mainly founded on three cornerstones: the concept of ﬂow of infor-
mation, security levels attached to activities, and the deﬁnition of security rules to
be applied to all communications.
The security policy (involving assignation, use, and deﬁnition of security lev-
els) also takes into account the way information is handled in our model. When
conﬁdentiality is involved, there may exist high-level activities which may need to
communicate with low-level activities (normally denied by the mandatory access
rules of "no write down"). So by also tagging data with a security level we gain
ﬂexibility as the mandatory rules are not broken, and still, with the help of ad-
ditional discretionary rules, we guarantee that this kind of actions are explicitly
allowed. Communications are then controlled according to speciﬁc security rules.
These rules are predeﬁned in the case of mandatory rules, where the security levels
of processes and data are always compared and applied; and in the case of discre-
tionary rules, they are externally deﬁned (for example in a ﬁle describing permissions
for the whole system). By allowing discretionary exceptions to the mandatory rules,
we obtain a highly expressive system. Consequently, the resulting properties are
rather weak as we do not take advantage of the MAC aspect of our model; however,
stronger properties could be guaranteed by imposing some consistency requirements
to the DAC rules.
Finally, we have demonstrated the speciﬁcity of our security mechanism: its
application to service-oriented computing with replies by the means of futures, and
the speciﬁc issues that are arisen by our communication mechanism.
A prototype of this security model has been implemented in the ProActive mid-
dleware [21] for distributed and mobile (Grid) computing, and is currently under
evaluation on real-size examples for scalability and ﬂexibility. In the future, it is
planned to study more speciﬁcally moblility aspects and to use a role-based access
control (RBAC) approach in order to extend and improve the discretionary access
to activities.
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A An Example
A.1 Context
We focus an a ﬁnancial application speciﬁcally oriented to the stock market. The
global scenario has the following actors: a stock exchange market, a few banks, and
some clients. In this scenario, the main idea is to transform some source information
in order to produce another type of information latter used as support in a trade
decision process (e.i. decisions to make with respect to the buying and selling of
actions in the stock market). In this sense, the stock exchange market will act as
the provider of the raw or source information, transferring it to its direct clients,
which in this case are the banks.
Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank Z
Client 2
Client n
trade
study
results
Client 1
information
raw
Stock
market
exchange
trade
orders
trade
orders
Fig. A.1. Generalized business schema for a ﬁnancial application.
By unfolding the general bank process (Figure A.1), we notice that it is composed
of other subprocesses. Figure A.2 exposes with the BPMN notation the composition
of a bank process. A reception process takes the information coming from the
stock exchange, and according to some ﬁltering and redistribution rules, it sends the
possible narrowed information to its speciﬁed targets. The targets may be external
business partners or they can be internal.
Following the bank’s internal or private workﬂow, after reception of the infor-
mation by the stockbroker process, the provided information is passed to a statis-
tic analysis, then confronted with historic forecasts, the result studied by market
experts, producing buying and selling orders, which are ﬁnally sent to the stock
exchange through the same initial stockbroker process. Finally, there is a new re-
distribution of information executed by the trade orders dispatcher. In this new
information distribution, the whole or part of the analysis results can be oﬀered and
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Communication
manager
External
entities
bank’s
own
branches
investment
groups
Stock
experts
stock
market
statistic
analysis
historic
forecast
analysis
receive
analysis
results
study and
approve
results
emit final
judgement
Automated
analysis
stock
broker
information
dispatcher
trade
orders
dispatcher
broadcaster
other clients
(individuals)
trade
decisions
Fig. A.2. A bank’s private business processes.
sold to other kind of clients, meanwhile the stockbroker places the trade orders to
the stock market. Moreover, the stockbroker process has two important activities,
one is the reception of information, and the other is the reply to this reception with
the trade orders.
A.2 An Implementation in Secured ProActive
The internal processes presented in the previous section are grouped into general
processes corresponding to ProActive activities named E (experts), A (analysis),
C1 and C2 (Communications), S (stock), I (investment), B (branch), and Clnt
(client).
Figure A.3 shows the information ﬂows translated into a ProActive communica-
tion schema (based on REQUESTS –Rq– and REPLIES –Rp).
Rq4 Rp4Rq2
Rp4’Rq4’Rp3Rq3
Clnt
Rq7
I B
Rq5 Rp5 Rq6 Rp6
E
A
Rq1
S
C1
Rp4’’
C2
Rp4’’’
Rq4’’
Fig. A.3. ProActive model for the banking process, with request and reply transmissions.
In the case of Rq1, S provides information to C1 in a "push" manner (through a
repetitive transmissions of requests), a constant feeding of information can be done,
and in consequence, there is no need of replies from C1 to S.
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Emission of information from C1 to A is achieved with Rq2. Exchange of infor-
mation between A and E is done with the pair Rq3-Rp3.
The communication between C2 and C1 requires a series of transmissions. C1
will require the results from C2 and will have to communicate through A and E.
Then, with Rq4, C1 asks the results to A; with Rq4’, A demands the results to E ;
in turn, with Rq4”, E communicates with C2 ; and ﬁnally, the response will return
to C1 trough the corresponding replies.
Information from C1 to I and B is provided on demand, hence the respective
pairs Rq5-Rp5 and Rq6-Rp6. Rq7 between C2 and Clnt follows the same methodol-
ogy as Rq1. Finally, transactions of trade orders between C1 and S are accomplished
with Rq8-Rp8.
From Figure A.3, the assignation of security levels is to be done, and depending
on these aﬀectations, entries for matrix M have to be added.
For the bank’s internal processes, let us deﬁne a relation of security levels with
λE = λA > λC1 > λC2 meaning that, process E gets the highest security level
because it represents the ﬁnancial expert’s work; process A also gets a high level
because it saves the results coming from E for the historic analysis; and process C1
gets the next highest level after A mostly because it has to manipulate the results or
trade decisions. With respect to the security levels for the bank’s external processes,
we suppose: λS > λC1 (the stock market requires to have a high level of protection),
λI > λC1 (the investment group requires also a high level), λB = λC1 (considering
the bank’s branches are "internal" processes), and λC2 > λClnt (the bank has a
higher level of security than the clients).
Once the security levels are assigned to processes, REQUESTS are analyzed in
order to determine what are the levels to be assigned to data transmitted, corre-
sponding entries are also required for the discretionary access.
Request Level of data Entry for M(α, β) Reason for reply
Rq1 λin= λC1 RqS→C1(d, λC1) —
Rq2 λin = λC1 — —
Rq3 λin = λA — λE = λA
Rq4 λin = λC1 — r = fut(f
′′E→C2
4 ) or r = fut(f
′A→E
4 )
Rp′′′4 authorized by λC2 < λC1
Rq4′ λin = λA — r = fut(f
′′E→C2
4 )
Rq4′′ λin = λC2 RqE→C2(d, λC2) λC2 < λE
Rq5 — — λC1 = λI
Rq6 — — λC1 = λB
Rq7 λin = λClnt RqC2→Clnt(d, λClnt) —
Table A.1
Summary of security levels assigned to the bank’s processes
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Table A.1 gives the complete overview of security levels given to data, the re-
quired entries for matrix M, and the values returned in the responses. From this
table, in the case of request Rq1, by assigning to the transmitted data the same
security level of the target (λC1), it is needed an entry or explicit rule, allowing
communications from S to C1.
For request Rq2 there is no needed entry for the matrix, and also there is no
reply.
In the case of request Rq3, there is no needed entry, and the corresponding reply
will be the value of r (i.e. whatever value process E will return as result for this
request). It is also shown the condition that allows the reply, which for Rq3 is
because λE = λA.
For the combined case of the "fourth" request, replies to Rq4, Rq4′ , and Rq4′′
will contain the reference to a future (corresponding to the value to be produced
by C2). Consequently the value of reply to C1 must be obtained directly from C2
by another reply Rp4′′′, and hence allowed to be transmitted because λC2 < λC1.
Other replies must only contain informations stating aliasing between futures (e.g.
the value of future f ′A→E4 is the future f
′′E→C2
4 ). Note that aother possible replies
go from E to C1, from C2 to A, but a reply containing the result from A to C1 is
forbidden, thus C1 must ﬁrst receive aliasing informations stating that the future
fC1→A4 is the future f
′′E→C2
4 before receiving Rp4
′′′.
For requests Rq5, and Rq6, there is no data transmitted in the request but they
both receive a reply value.
Rq7 is similar to Rq1.
This example shows the speciﬁcity of our security model. Considering secure
path for information ﬂow from C1 to C2, formally written SecϕA.E(C1, C2), the
ﬂow of information transits through high-level processes (i.e. processes A and E).
Classically, these high-level process would block any subsequent communication be-
cause of the "no write down" property (e.g. request Rq4′′ is sending (or writing)
data from a high to a low level process, and in consequence, it would be blocked).
Nevertheless, the security model allows a safe communication from end-to-end (in
this case between C1 and C2).
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